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1The Impact of Technology on Cash Usage
I. Introduction
“Cash is dirty … Cash is heavy … Cash is inequitable … Cash is
quaint, technologically speaking … Cash is expensive … Cash is
obsolete.” This is how James Gleick (1996) summarises the case
against cash. By contrast, electronic means of payment are clean,
technologically advanced and supposedly cheap and convenient.
Thus, it is not surprising that industry representatives are
optimistic that currency will be replaced by technologically more
advanced electronic transfers and e-moneys of assorted varieties
(Capie and Gormez 2000, Craig 1998). In a similar vein, monetary
economists like K. Dowd (1997), B. Friedman (1999) or M. King
(1999) have predicting the imminent disappearance of currency from
common usage.
We are sceptical about the accuracy of these predictions.  Indeed
we believe that currency, notes and coin, may be better protected
against fundamental changes induced by IT than many other
financial products and mechanisms.  For example, the operation of
equity markets has been, and will continue to be, revolutionised
by IT.
2In the second Section of this paper we examine the particular
characteristics of currency, notably its acceptability, anonymity
and simplicity, and compare these characteristics with those of
electronic alternatives.
In the third Section of the paper we examine how such
characteristics have affected the relative costs of using
differing payment media, and the returns that may be expected from
producing and circulating e-money.  In this Section we examine
micro-level data on the cost structure of using differing means of
payment and highlight the crucial role of security concerns.
In the fourth Section we shall review the macro-level time series
data on trends in currency usage, and their determinants, in the
main developed countries.  We shall note that relative currency
usage, measured as the ratio of currency outstanding to GDP, has
in a few cases risen, and has in most countries only declined
slowly.  Absolute usage of currency, both in nominal and real
terms, i.e. after deflation by an appropriate price index,
generally continues to rise.  By comparison, the outstanding value
of e-money is minuscule.
We conclude, in Section 5, that expectations of the demise of
currency at the hands of IT are distinctly premature.
3II.  The relative characteristics of e-money and currency
If the use of information technology, particularly e-money, is to
drive currency, either largely or wholly, out of use, such e-money
must be able at least to replicate, and in some respects improve
upon, the characteristics of currency.  In this Section we shall
consider six characteristics, acceptability, speed of completing
exchange, yield, security, convenience, and anonymity (or in other
words the form of associated information transfer).
There is no doubt that IT mechanisms for affecting exchanges can
equal, or improve upon, currency in some respects, and for some
purposes.  The speed of completion is usually as fast, or
sometimes faster, with a plastic card or e-money; (though studies
of a German Retailer organisation (Zellekens and Rueter 1996) show
that cash is the fastest means of payment at the POS.  Cards are
usually faster at ticket machines - especially when they can be
used without an associated need for contact and verification with
the card provider).  Whereas there is no easy way of providing a
non-zero nominal yield on currency, it should be technically
simple to provide for a positive yield on credit balances stored
electronically, though purveyors have been so far noticeably
reluctant to do so (reasons why this might have been so are
discussed further in Section III).  In many, perhaps most,
respects it is more convenient to carry around a single card for
small, repetitive purchases (e.g. telephone, subway) than a
pocketful of cash.  There is little doubt that plastic cards
(credit or debit) are being used for an increasing number of
transactions (mostly small valued), some of which would previously
have been settled by cash transfers.  Moreover, e-purses are being
4developed that allow the direct transfer of credit balances from
purse to purse without the immediate involvement of the underlying
financial institution.
Normally most e-transfers involve direct information transfers
with the issuing institutions.  Thus, diagrammatically most e-
transfers have taken the form, as follows:-
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With e-purses the transaction can involve a transfer of value from
payer to payee without information on that transfer immediately
going to the financial institution involved.
This latter is important because the most important distinction
(on our view) between the characteristics of currency on the one
hand and e-transfers on the other is that currency is completely
anonymous, whereas (at least up till now with the development of
e-purses) e-transfers have facilitated, and proliferated, record-
keeping of agents' expenditure patterns.  Currency is anonymous in
the sense that the recipient of a cash payment neither has to
know, nor learns, anything about the counter-party in the process
5of trade.1  The only information required is whether the note, i.e.
the instrument itself, is genuine or counterfeit.  By contrast
most e-transfers immediately provide a record of what a customer
has bought, i.e. exactly what goods/assets, to two counterparties,
to the seller and to the underlying financial institution.
Even when e-purses are developed, which do not necessitate (but
may allow) such information transfers, they must involve
electronic equipment.  How can the payer/payee be confident that
the other counterparty will not be recording the transaction in a
manner that may leave an audit trail that can subsequently be
followed, (see, for example, the Report by the Committee on
Payment and Settlement Systems and the Group of Computer Experts
of the central banks of the Group of Ten countries (BIS, August
1996), especially p. 26)?  Moreover, electronic equipment can go
wrong (ibid, Section 3.3, p. 13), and `hacking' may be a problem
(n.b. the recent `Love Bug'; also note ibid, especially Sections
4.2.3. and 4.3.1).2  Of course, currency may be counterfeit, and
                                                                
1  As K. Rogoff, (1998), p. 286, notes:-
"Government currency has an anonymity feature that
differentiates it sharply from media such as ATMs and credit
cards.  It is this anonymity that makes large-denomination
notes so useful to the underground economy."
2  Also, see Implications for Central Banks of the Development of
Electronic Money, (BIS, October 1996), pp 8/9.
One of the main problems with e-money is security, and maintaining
complex enough encryption algorithms is becoming a bigger problem.
Breaking the code of e-money may not be too difficult with the
high levels of computing power available today, and will only get
worse in the future.  A key issue that needs to be addressed is
how to minimise the loss due to fraud, both to the end-consumer
and to the issuing commercial bank.  When publicly visible (due to
media exploitation) e-money fraud should occur, consumers may not
then be comfortable committing to this technology, and if they do,
it may be for small transactions, to eliminate the coins and small
bank notes in their wallets.
6leaves the holder open to robbery3, but for the foreseeable future
the risks are more familiar than with e-purses, (see also the next
Section).4
In any case the development of e-purses allowing free
transferability between users without recourse to the underlying
issuers is as yet mainly a theoretical concept, not a practical
reality.  Thus The Report by the Committee on Payment and
Settlement Systems (1996), had the following comments (pp 5/6):-
"Transferability.  The Task Force found that free
transferability, in which consumers, merchants or banks may
make unlimited direct transfers between one another, is a
theoretical concept only.  In all systems analysed,
transferability is restricted, although the degree and types
of restriction differ across systems.”
This statement remains as true in 2001 as it was in 1996.
Either the actuality, or the suspicion, that e-transfers are
subject to recording either by the counterparty (criminals and tax
evaders will not trust each other) or by third parties is likely
to make such a medium unpopular in those cases where agents wish
to leave no tracks of their activities, whether the transfer comes
within the grey, black or criminal economies (ibid, Section 6.1).
                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
We are grateful to John Tsoucalas for these latter considerations.
3  As Rogoff, op. cit., and his discussant, R. McCauley, noted, the
relationship between crime and cash holding is ambiguous.  Less
crime means that people feel safer to carry cash around on them,
on the other hand, criminals `use cash heavily', ibid, p. 277.
4  Kabelac (1999) states, footnote 21, that "the risks of loss,
theft and counterfeiting are the highest, relatively speaking, for
cyber money".
7Electronic transfers must involve a transfer between a
transmitting and a receiving device.  Each separate party may be
certain that her own device is leaving no record behind, but how
can she possibly be sure that the same is true for the
counterparty?  So, if a transactor wants anonymity in e-transfers,
it will not only be necessary for that to be technologically
possible; it will still require trust between counterparties, and,
as noted above, that will be unlikely.5
 Currency will do far better.  Many of us have heard stories about
the man paying for his stint in a brothel on his credit card, but
this is likely to remain a minority means of payment in such
circumstances.  Bengtsson, (1999), has written, p. 25, "Moreover,
in the last few years, the cash card has become available to the
public.  We use cash cards in the same situations as cash, for
small transactions like buying a newspaper, or for illegal
transactions as in deals on Pusher Street."  For the reasons
already set out, we think that the latter is extremely improbable;
we will deal with small transactions soon.
Hoarders, moreover, will want both durability and also anonymity.6
However, in all likelihood, they cannot have both. Given the
security concerns analysed above, it cannot be expected that an e-
                                                                
5  One correspondent (K. Dowd) wrote to one of us, as follows:-
"Is it possible that IT might provide us with anonymity?  If
so, would you be willing to concede the case that the demand
for currency might disappear?"
The answer to the latter question is `no' for the reason given
above.
8money issuer can develop a type of anonymous e-money with
unrestricted validity.7 Since the technical development is
proceeding fast – helping both e-money issuers and
hackers/counterfeiters – issuers have to upgrade their e-money
periodically. Otherwise, they would run the risk that
counterfeiters break the code and produce large amounts of fake e-
money. This means that from time to time users of e-money have to
exchange old money balances against new ones.8 So, even a type of
e-money that can be used anonymously in payments (like, for
instance, Mondex) is not as good as cash when it comes to
hoarding.
A considerable proportion of currency usage is already represented
by holders who wish to maintain their activities out of sight of
their own government, and/or are dubious about the maintained
value of their own government's currency.  For example, much of
the holding of US dollars and of German Dm is by residents of
other countries, e.g. Russia, who regard such currency as a better
store of value than the local currency, see Rogoff (1998) and the
many references therein.  Currency usage is, to some considerable
extent, related to `bad' behaviour, either individual or
governmental.9  There are few signs that such `bad' behaviour is on
                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
6 Hoarding may be substantial. See Boeschoten (1992), Krueger
(2000) and Van Hove (1999b).
7 Therefore, the remark of Browne and Cronin (1995), 106 that
‘electronic money does not depreciate physically (unlike
banknotes)’ does not apply. First, it is not even clear whether
plastic money does indeed have a longer life-span (in all
likelihood not), and, second, more important is the technical
depreciation which forces e-money holders to ‘update’ their
balances.
8 The BIS (1996, 19) reports that some devices will automatically
cease to function after a certain number of offline transactions.
9  As Rogoff notes, ibid, Section 2, `External and Underground
Demand for OECD Currencies', pp 265-270, it is extremely difficult
9any trend decline, and technical innovations (and informational
technology) are not likely to affect such behaviour patterns much
in either direction.
Few of us use high value currency notes for ordinary transactions;
probably many of us will never have held notes of a higher
denomination than £20 for means of payment purposes.  Habits,
however, differ between countries, and in some countries, such as
Germany, Japan and Switzerland, high value notes are much more
commonly used than in the UK, for example.  Nevertheless one
possible handle towards assessing how much outstanding currency is
used because of `bad' behaviour10 is to examine what proportion of
currency outstanding is represented by high denomination notes.
Rogoff, ibid, Figures 5a and 5b, p. 276, has already done this
exercise, and these Figures are reproduced and extended for
another couple of years.  We also show the proportion of currency
outstanding represented by notes of a value greater than £20,
estimated at the exchange ruling at the end of 1997.  See Figures
2(a) and (b) and 3(a) and (b).
                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
to estimate the division of those notes not held for domestic
transactions purposes between those held externally and in the
`underground' economy.  Fortunately for this analysis such a
division is unnecessary here, since both motives derive from `bad'
behaviour, whereby the note user wishes to keep his activities out
of reach of his own government.  (In some cases foreign notes are
the only way to protect oneself against very bad government
behaviour.)
10  A potential related measure is to test what proportion of notes
outstanding have been physically contaminated by contact with
drugs, notably cocaine which is often `snorted' in this way.  A
report by J. Burns in the Financial Times (4th October, 1999, p.
4) stated that more than 99% of all the capital's banknotes
revealed some, perhaps minute, traces of cocaine!
10
The one circumstance where one might, indeed, expect information
technology to bring an end to the use of national currency would
be when an (authoritarian) government might prescribe that all
transactions must go through an electronic device.  It is not hard
to imagine the advantages that a government might envisage from
being able to record (electronically) every payment that every
agent in that country made.11  This is a perfectly feasible
Orwellian nightmare.  Of course, the inhabitants of that country
would seek to hide some of their transactions from the government
either by using foreign currencies (e.g. US $s) or reverting to
commodity money (e.g. cigarettes or, perhaps, gold).
Electronic devices involve the actuality, or at least the
possibility, of recording; note transfers do not.12  That fact by
                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
11  One correspondent commented that Singapore is the country where
the government is pushing hardest `down the path of e-money'.
12  The punctilious will comment that this is not quite true.  The
transfer of specially marked notes has been a means of catching
criminals for decades.  Our defence to this is that the recording
of transfers is an order of magnitude easier via electronic
devices than by marking notes.  In addition, marking notes does
not completely reduce anonymity.  If neither of the two parties
involved in a payment registers the transaction, anonymity will be
preserved - no matter whether the note was marked or not.
Another argument is that the money laundering legislation
restricts the ability (in principle) of customers to make large
withdrawals from, or deposits to, their bank without full
reporting.
Mervyn King, of the Bank of England, places some emphasis on this
point.  He wrote to one of us (private correspondence):-
"I agree that there will always be a demand for anonymity.
The question is how that will be provided.  The anonymity of
11
itself will keep currency in being, and may already account for
the greater proportion (by value) of currency outstanding.  The
distinctive nature of currency, as contrasted with e-transfers,
may also be an artefact of the regulatory environment, as well as
of technology.  If governments permit strong encryption without
requiring law enforcement to have a "window"; if courts rule that
transactions data are the private property of the transactor, and
require a comparably strong probable cause (to goods stored in a
person's house) before they can be scrutinized; and if e-money
issuers can construct credible legal "firewalls" so that they
cannot peek at their customers' transactions, then e-money will be
a closer substitution for cash than otherwise.13
But there are numerous other reasons, thankfully more mundane, why
currency will continue in use for the foreseeable future.  In
particular currency is legal tender within its national
                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
cash payments has been very markedly reduced by money
laundering legislation.  It is now no longer possible to
obtain large sums of cash from a financial intermediary
without the authorities being informed.  That is because the
authorities can pass laws and bring informal pressure on
financial intermediaries to provide the authorities with such
information.  Equally, electronic transactions can be made
technically secure.  Encryption is at the point where private
sector intermediaries can provide encryption services of a
form that will not be broken for a very long time, if ever.
But what criminals and others would fear is not that the
technology was not secure, but that the authorities would
bring pressure to bear on the intermediaries to pass
information to them.  So I think that anonymity is less a
matter of the technology of the means of payment and more a
matter of government pressure and regulation.  Hence I see no
significant difference between cash and electronic payments
in terms of anonymity."
13  We are grateful to Ed Green for these thoughts.  Also see Green
(1999).
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boundaries; it cannot legally be refused,14 (except on evidence of
counterfeiting).  Plastic cards can be, and often are, refused,
e.g. by taxis, restaurants, etc.  While some plastic cards do have
a (limited) international usage, the one essential that anyone
going to a foreign country has to have is the appropriate foreign
currency.  Within each country there are numerous forms of
competing plastic cards, each with a limited range of uses (e.g.
store loyalty cards), in contrast to currency whose acceptability
within each country is legally mandated to be universal.  Over
time it is possible that different schemes become inter-operable
or that some brand (or brands) of card may become increasingly
widely accepted, and that the electronic instruments needed for
such exchanges cheaper and more widely available, (e.g. swipe
machines in every taxi and pub), but that will take some
considerable time; meanwhile currency has first-mover advantages15;
it is already there as a simple means of payment.  Smart cards do
have a potential advantage in that they could be programmed to
provide the holder of a credit balance with a rate of interest,
(this is technically more difficult with cash).  It is, however,
                                                                
14  What is most important is the general acceptance of a means of
payment.  The legal imposition of legal tender is simply a means
of bolstering such acceptability.  That status may be neither
necessary nor sufficient to achieve such general acceptability.
It may not be sufficient because a purchaser will not go to the
cost of calling in the law if a seller refuses to accept legal
tender currency, e.g. in a hyperinflationary country.  It will not
be necessary if convention makes the notes acceptable.  We have
been told that now Bank of England one-pound notes have gone, no
notes are legal tender in Scotland or Northern Ireland.  Thus, the
legal tender function may be less significant than is commonly
believed.
15  On this, see S. Schmitz (2001).
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noticeable that issuers of cards have not been rushing to offer
interest to holders of credit balances with themselves.
As electronic money becomes more widely usable, and also if it
should offer a higher rate of return, it may indeed substitute for
currency in a wider range of possible uses.  But electronic money
does not have the characteristics of currency.  It is not
anonymous, and it is not legal tender.  Given these special
characteristics, the demise of currency at the hands of
information technology will not happen,16 at least not unless an
authoritarian government should decree that it must happen.  The
fact that such a prospect would terrify anyone with the slightest
concern for liberty and freedom among people underlines just how
important currency usage is for our way of life, including our
`bad' behaviour.
Although there has been some eye-catching futurology in recent
months suggesting that electronics might bring about the complete
replacement of currency, and with that a control problem for the
Central Bank, a BIS report on the subject, a study on the
`Implications for Central Banks of the Development of Electronic
Money', (BIS, October 1996), reached much more mundane, (but also
                                                                
16  John Tsoucalas has commented (private correspondence) that,
even in a technologically advanced economy, such as Australia, the
data show that despite "the high penetration rate of electronic
banking cash still has a specific purpose in the economy, and it
appears other instruments and services are declining, such as the
use of money orders and cheques."
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more firmly based) conclusions (pages 7 and 10 especially), that
any such shrinkage is likely to be limited.17
So, there would appear no reason to believe that the demand for
currency will disappear in the foreseeable future.  Let us
conclude this Section with an analogy.  The relationship between
e-money and currency is rather akin to that between computer-
assisted virtual sex and masturbation.  The former is conceptually
superior and technologically more advanced, but the latter is
simpler, always available, leaves no record (unlike the computer),
has no moving parts to go wrong and is immune to distressful
hacking.  In both cases the latter simpler option is unlikely to
disappear in the face of electronic competition.
III. The business case for e-purses and cash
One may argue that the main threat for cash comes from debit
cards. In recent years debit cards have quickly gained
considerable market share in the segment of POS payments. Indeed,
in Iceland debit and credit cards have been so successful that
some economists thinks that the end of cash may be close in
Iceland (De Grauwe, Buyst, Rinaldi 1999). However, if anonymity is
as important as we think (see proceeding chapter), debit cards
will never completely replace cash. Costs and convenience may also
                                                                
17  See also BIS (2000), Godschalk and Krueger (2000), Goldfinger
(1999) and Snellman et al. (2000).
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favour the use of cash.18 Even as online connections are getting
faster and cheaper, the need to have such a connection and the
time to type in the PIN (validate it, type it in again if an error
occurred, etc.) make online transactions inconvenient – even for
people who are not concerned about anonymity. So, the final blow
for cash would have to come from other, more cash-like, means of
payment. The prime candidate is the e-purse (embedded in a card or
a mobile phone).
a. E-purses: Taking Stock
E-purses are used as a general means of payment mainly in Europe.19
In many European countries, the circulation of card based purses
is remarkably high.20 In five European countries (Austria, Belgium,
Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands) card penetration (measured in
per cent of the population) is higher than 50 per cent. However,
most of these cards are not used. For the Belgian Proton card the
share of activated cards (i.e. cards that were loaded at least
once) is 30 per cent (of all cards issued). In all other countries
surveyed this share is below 20 per cent. Even these figures may
overstate the use of cards since the fact that they have been
loaded once does not necessarily imply that they were used
subsequently. In Germany where a card is defined as “active” if it
                                                                
18 Except perhaps in very small communities where everyone knows
everyone else, and anonymity is extremely difficult to maintain
(like Iceland?).
19 After a failed pilot project in New York, the development in the
US has almost come to a standstill.
20 Unless indicated otherwise, the following overview is based on
Van Hove (2000). Other useful sources are Forschungszentrum
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is used at least once a month the share of active cards is a mere
1 per cent (Riehm 2000). Thus, most of the cards issued are not
used for payments. A low level of usage also becomes apparent when
looking at the frequency of use. For all cards issued the average
frequency of card-use is below one transaction per month (in all
countries) and below 3 transactions per month if only activated
cards are considered. Average balances stored on e-purses provide
a similar picture: there are only three countries in which the
average balance per card is above 1 EUR (Belgium, Luxembourg,
Netherlands); there is no country with an average balance above 5
EUR. To put the above numbers into perspective it is useful to
look at the Belgian example. The Belgian Proton purse is in many
ways the most successful scheme. However, in 1998 there were a
mere 28 million Proton transactions compared with an estimated
number of cash transactions of 4 billion (Van Hove 2000, 22).
Thus, so far, payments with e-purses are of marginal significance.
In all cases usage per card is small and the cash-substitution
effect is negligible. Even more worrying, in some countries e-
purse use seems to be stagnating or even declining. Danmønt, one
of the oldest e-purse schemes, has basically had constant usage
figures over the last three years (Danmønt 2001). In Germany, the
number of activated e-purses (GeldKarte) and the number of
transactions rose in 1999. But the number of terminals and the
value of transactions declined (Riehm 2000).
                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
Karlsruhe (1999), Godschalk and Krueger (2000) and SmartEuro
(2000).
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b. Tentative Cost Comparisons
Costs of payment methods are difficult to measure. Even if they
could be measured correctly they would be difficult to compare
because payment transactions differ substantially: there are
large-value and small value payments, remote payments and face-to-
face payments, etc.
Never-the-less, there are a number of cost studies and they mostly
provide a positive picture for cash. Most studies show that cash
still is a highly competitive means of payment. Studies of
American, Dutch and German retail organisations found that cash is
the cheapest means of payment at the POS (see tables 1, 2 and 3).
Table 1 Costs of Alternative Payment Methods for US Supermarkets
Cash Cheque ACH Credit Card Online Debit
Cost per transaction 0.072$ 0.426$ 0.279$ 0.808$ 0.299$
The numbers refer to 1993.
Source: Food Marketing Institute (1994), quoted from Chakravorti (1997, 5)
Table 2  Costs of Alternative Payment Methods for German Retailers
In DM Cash e-purse# Direct Debit*** POZ* ec-cash** Cheque
Cost/transaction 0.17-0.29 0.378 1.32 1.45 1.71 0.98-1.39
Source: Zellekens and Rueter (1996) and Schneider (1998). The numbers refer to
the mid 1990s. The costs of an e-purse payment refer to 1998.
* Electronic direct debit without online verification.
** Electronic direct debit scheme with online verification offered by German
banks
*** Electronic direct debit scheme with online verification offered by other
providers
# GeldKarte transaction
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Table 3  Costs of Alternative Payment Methods for Dutch Retailers
In EUR Cash Debit Card Giro e-purse Credit Card
Cost/transaction 0.095 0.22 0.19 0.25 2.50
Source: Jaarsma and Rijt-Veltman (2000) quoted in Van Hove (2000). The numbers
refer to 1998.
A similar pattern is emerging for payment costs of UK banks.
According to estimates of Retail Banking Research (a market
research and consultancy company) the cost per cash transaction
are the lowest (see table 4).21
Table 4  Costs of Payment for UK Banks
Cash Electronic
Transfer
Card
Transaction
Cheques Credit Transfer
(paper)
0.083 0.2 0.3 0.45 0.5
£ per transaction; Source Retail Banking Research
Not all studies, however, reach the same conclusion. In a study of
payment costs in Iceland and Belgium De Grauwe, Buyst and Rinaldi
(1999) find that card payments are cheaper than cash payments (see
table 5).
Table 5  Costs of Card and Cash Payments in Belgium and Iceland
1997
Cards Cash
Belgium 26 BFr (1.3%) 22.6 BFr (9%)
Iceland 29 BFr (1.6%) 125 BFr (n.n.)
Source: De Grauwe, Buyst, Rinaldi (1999); percentages in brackets refer to
transaction costs in per cent of the average transaction value; in 1997 one US$
was equal to 35.77 Belgian Francs
Without detailed knowledge of the source of the data and the
methodology used, it is difficult to determine which estimates
deserve more credibility. One reason for the differences may be
that from the point of view of the retailer the relevant costs are
not just the direct costs of a particular payment device.
Retailers are interested in the costs of the entire payment
process. Zellekens and Rueter (1996) show that “speed of payment”
                                                                
21 This is partly due to the fact that most cash transactions do
not require the involvement of a bank.
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is a decisive cost factor. Whether a supermarket has to man 5 or 6
cash counters over the day is much more important than the
question whether e-purse handling at the end of the day is half an
hour faster than sorting out cash receipts. Since cash still is a
very fast means of payment the overall costs of using cash are
comparatively low.
Table 6  Various Instruments in Retail Payments in Germany
in % of
turnover
Cash Bill Retailer
Cards
Credit
Cards
POZ* Electronic Cash** Check Other
1994 78.7 6.5 0.4 3.3 1.7 0.8 8.3 0.3
1997 76.5 6.5 0.5 3.5 6.5 2.5 3.5 0.5
* Electronic direct debit without online verification.
** Electronic direct debit scheme with online verification
Source: e-card business (1998, 6)
Table 7  Payments for Goods, Services and Financial Transfers in
the UK
Cheques Paper Credit
Transf.
Automated
Payments
Credit
Cards
Debit
Cards
Other
Cards
Postal
Order
Cash
1989 15.4 2.2 6.9 2.7 0.3 0.4 3.7 68.3
1998 11.4 1.7 12.6 4.8 7.2 0.8 3.5 58.0
Source: APACS
Table 8  Retail Payments: The Share of Cash and Non-cash
Transactions
% of Retail transactions
Cash Non-cash
U.S. 75 25
Europe 76-86 14-24
Japan 90 10
Source: Federal Reserve System (1998). Numbers probably refer to the early 1990s
(no date given).
The competitiveness of cash is also reflected in its almost
unchanged high market share in retail payments.22 In Germany, for
instance, access products such as POS payments (with and without
online verification) have been growing strongly. Still, between
1994 and 1997, the share of cash has declined only marginally (see
table 6).
                                                                
22 In Holland the share of cash in retail transactions is estimated
to be 83 per cent. See Jaarsma and Rijt-Veltman (2000) quoted in
Van Hove (2000).
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In the UK, traditionally a more cheque-oriented economy, the use
of both, cheques and cash has fallen significantly throughout the
1990s. Still, cash is by far the most important means of payment
(see table 7). These estimates are in line with estimates of the
Federal Reserve System for the U.S., Japan and Europe (see table
8).
These numbers show that cash is a competitive payment product and
that most countries are still far away from a cash less society.
Even if e-purses became much more efficient this might primarily
affect other means of payment. So far, the one instrument that has
strongly lost ground vis-à-vis new payments methods is the cheque
(ECB 1999, 46-7).
c. Security and the Role of Counterfeiting
A group of economists sees bank notes as particularly vulnerable
to the activities of counterfeiters. Dowd (1998) claims that the
problem of counterfeiting has become so bad that central banks
actively encourage the use of electronic substitutes. According to
Neal and Eisler (1996, 36-48) the problem of counterfeiting US$
notes has reached dramatic proportions. They claim that terrorists
finance their activities with faked dollars and that dollar
counterfeits are used as a weapon in ‘monetary warfare' against
the United States. However, their estimate of US$10 billion of
counterfeits (2.3 per cent of the total amount of currency
circulation) is not supported by empirical evidence. According to
the Fed, in 1995, detected counterfeits amounted to 0.0075% of the
currency in circulation (Allison and Pianalto 1997, 562). Although
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this is high compared to countries like Germany (see table 9), it
is hardly an alarming figure. Of course it may be possible, that
detected counterfeits give a misleading picture. However, as
Allison (1996, 321) points out, the Fed receives a large portion
of the total currency balances each year. Each month about 20 per
cent of the domestic circulation is received. Since all bank notes
that are returned to the Fed are examined, the Fed gets a fairly
accurate picture of the amount of counterfeiting. Information
about foreign circulation may be less reliable. But since a
certain fraction of foreign circulation is returned to the US each
year, the Fed gets also information about counterfeiting abroad.
On average, the share of counterfeits of all notes returned from
abroad was lower than the average for the total circulation (0.005
per cent, see Allison 1996, 322).23
When interpreting these figures it should be kept in mind that –
at least in the case of the US – the majority of counterfeits is
seized before they get into circulation (Roberds 1998, 44).
Table 9  Detected Counterfeits in Three Countries
Detected
Counterfeits
Bank Notes in
Circulation
Counterfeits in % of
Circulation
United States
(1995)
30 million US$ 390 billion US$ 0.0075
Canada (1999) 4.2 million Can$ 36.5 billion Can$ 0.011
Germany (1999) 2.316 million DM 274 billion DM 0.00079
Source: Allison (1996, 321), Allison and Pianalto (1997, 562), Bank of Canada
(2000a,30 and 2000b), Deutsche Bundesbank (2000, 126-8)
A noteworthy feature of the data is that counterfeiting seems to
be a more serious problem in the US and Canada than in Germany
                                                                
23 See also United States Treasury (2000) report on counterfeiting
of US$ abroad.
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(see table 9).24 Still, it appears that the problem of
counterfeiting is greatly exaggerated by some authors. The
reported figures can hardly be used as an argument against cash.
Plastic card fraud, for instance, causes much higher losses. In
the UK alone, plastic card fraud (debit-, credit-, and check-card)
produced losses of more than UK£ 100 millions in almost every year
since 1990 (APACS 2000).
The small scale of counterfeiting of bank notes can be partly
explained by technical progress. Technical progress has not just
favoured the development of new media of payments. It has also
increased the quality of bank notes – a fact that is sometimes
overlooked. In many countries, bank notes incorporate a number of
safety features that make counterfeiting difficult.25
While counterfeiting is hardly a fundamental threat for currency
it may well be one for e-purses. In particular for those types of
e-purse that promise anonymity, counterfeiting may become a large
problem (Ely 1997, 102-3). In order to defend themselves against
the attempts of hackers, e-purse issuers will have to upgrade
their systems continuously. But even if they do so, the risk
remains that hackers successfully break the encryption.26 This has
some unpleasant implications for e-purse issuers. The typical e-
purse user is no expert in encryption and therefore unlikely to be
                                                                
24 The Fed has introduced new notes with better safety features
relatively late. See Allison and Pianalto (1997).
25In Australia, the introduction of polymer notes has reduced
counterfeiting dramatically. See Coventry (1998).
26 Successful attempts to crack encryption are reported in Bonorris
(1997, 33), Pollack (1996) and Wayner (1998).
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willing to shoulder the risk of counterfeiting.27 Therefore,
issuers will have to carry the risk themselves if they want to
persuade households and firms to switch to e-purses. This implies
that issuing e-purses can be a very risky business. As McAndrews
(1997, 24) points out, digital counterfeiting can easily wipe out
the entire reserves of an e-purse system. Even a 100 per cent
backing of the e-money stored on e-purses could be insufficient to
prevent bankruptcy (McAndrews 1997, 14).
A fraud case that occurred in Japan illustrates the potential
dangers (see Pollack 1996). Japanese ‘Pachinko’ (pinball) parlours
introduced magnetic stripe cards as means of payments. These cards
were issued by Sumitomo Bank and Mitsubishi Corporation. The card
technology was supplied by Nippon Telegraph and Telephone (NTT).
Large-scale fraud became possible when gangs stole reading
machines and started to copy new value on old cards. The damage
was considerable. Sumitomo and Mitsubishi lost a combined US$600
billion. That is about 15 times the annual value of detected bank
note counterfeits in the U.S., Canada and Germany combined.
Admittedly, magnetic stripe cards are not very safe. Therefore,
the industry moves increasingly to smart cards. Smart cards have
an embedded chip and are much safer. However, even smart cards
have been cracked (Wayner 1998).
Last but not least, attacks from the ‘outside’ are not the only
problem. Even when safety against attacks from outside may be
                                                                
27 Cash users are forced to shoulder the risk of fraud. However,
simple visual inspection can help a cash-user to some extent to
determine whether a bank note is faked or not. In the case of e-
money such inspection is impossible for the normal user.
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sufficiently high, this still leaves fraud committed by insiders.
This problem is emphasised by a number of authors. Bonorris (1997,
28), for instance, argues that ‘unauthorised use of encryption
keys by insiders may prove to be the Achilles’ heel of digital
money.’ The BIS (1996b, 52) also underlines that an attack on
‘administrative security’ during the manufacturing, issuing and
distribution process may be a more severe problem then attempts to
break the code embedded in stored value cards.
The unresolved security problem and the potential dimension of the
problem, make e-money issuers prone to crises of confidence. If it
is known to the public that fraud can lead to bankruptcy of an e-
money issuer, rumours about fraud can easily spark a run
(McAndrews 1997, 24).
When assessing the existing security measures, the BIS (1996b, 21)
concludes that adequate security for electronic money systems can
be achieved. However, as the BIS points out, there is a trade-off
in the areas of cost, functionality, speed and reliability. Thus,
higher security involves either less seigniorage (maximum balances
per card), less convenience and flexibility for the user
(restricted offline use, time limits) or higher costs (better
storage devices, better cryptography, online authorisation etc.).
Thus, security issues may have important implications for costs
and revenues.
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d. Is there a Business case for e-purses?
A key problem for e-purse issuers is counterfeiting. Given the
potentially large size of fraud, issuers will have to find an
effective way to deal with this risk (and the other risks involved
in running an e-money scheme). In order to protect themselves, e-
money issuers will have use the following means against
counterfeiting:
- frequent technical updates
- limitations on the maximum amount that can be stored on cards
- limitations on the duration of e-money balances
- no peer-to-peer payments28
Limitations on maximum values do not just decrease the maximum
damage that can occur within a certain period. Low maximum values
also create smaller incentives for hackers. Thus, the lower is the
maximum balance per card, the lower the probability of
counterfeiting. Therefore, risk considerations favour fairly low
limits for the maximum balances that can be loaded onto a card.
Limitations on the duration of e-money balances allow issuers to
frequently update e-money balances. The use of technically
advanced systems is an important protection against fraud.
Finally, the exclusion of peer-to-peer transactions allows issuers
a more effective control of the system – in particular, faster
recognition of an attack.
                                                                
28 Only one scheme, Mondex, allows peer-to-peer payments. However,
this makes Mondex more prone to fraud. To protect the system,
Mondex has to use a much more sophisticated chip. Whereas Proton
cards cost EUR 2.5 a Mondex card is estimated to cost between EUR
8 and 10 (SmartEuro 2000, 12-13).
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These measures do not just reduce risks they also have potentially
huge effects on costs and revenues. Frequent updates of the system
in order to stay on top of the technological development
substantially increase the costs of e-money schemes. The other
measures reduce the way in which e-money can be used. In
particular, they limit the use of e-money for hoarding purposes.
This has serious implications for e-money issuers. Only a fraction
of the total stock of bank notes, maybe not even 5 per cent, is
used for legal payments (Avery et al. 1986 and 1987, Boeschoten
1992). If the demand for e-money mainly comes from people who want
to use it as a means of payments in legal transactions, average
balances per smart card are likely to be small. Ely (1997, 103)
calculates that 100 million cards with an average balance of
US$10029 would yield merely US$10 billion of total e-currency in
circulation, as compared with a present total currency circulation
of US$530 billion. This implies that the potential amount of
seigniorage is also relatively small. Assuming an interest rate of
6 per cent this would yield US$600 million or US$6 per card. In an
estimation of potential seigniorage losses of the Bundesbank,
Janssen and Lange (1997, 7) assume a card circulation of 60
million and average balances of DM 78.50 (about EUR 40). Using
again an interest rate of 6 per cent an average seigniorage of DM
5.25 (about EUR 2.65) per card can be calculated. Given that a
card costs already EUR 2.5, this is hardly enough to break even.30
                                                                
29 An average balance of US$100 is also assumed by Boeschoten and
Hebbink (1996), 2.
30 Technical change and the normal ‘tear and wear’ limit the life
span of a card. Therefore, costs cannot be spread over many years.
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Davis (2000) quotes estimates that a European-wide smart card
system based on CEPS (Common Electronic Purse Specifications)
would cost between US$ 4.8 and 6.6 billion.
If seigniorage is not high enough to cover the costs of e-purse
schemes issuers will have to rely on fees. Goldfinger (1999) cites
a calculation by Edgar, Dunn and Company (a consulting firm), that
shows that a medium sized issuer with 400,000 cards and 250
transactions per card would break even in 5 years with the
following fee structure: customers pay 7.5$ per year and a load
fee of 0.3$, merchants pay a commission of 0.55%. Clearly, 250
transactions per year is a far cry from reality. Currently,
issuers are happy to record 10 transactions per year per card (Van
Hove 2000). So, either they would have to take higher fees or
accept temporary losses (that might turn out to be permanent).
However, relatively high fees will not make it easier to market e-
money. So far, merchants have resisted the introduction of costly
new payment methods. One reason for this is that the partial
substitution of cash will not reduce costs very much because cash
handling involves high fixed costs. Customers are often quite
content with existing means of payment (Good 1998, 15, Van Hove
1999a) and are not willing to pay for yet another card.
Taking the views of customers and merchants into account, there
are clearly narrow limits for the potential size of fees. This
implies, first, that it is unlikely that interest will be paid on
e-money balances and, second, that it is still not clear whether
e-money schemes will ever reach profit territory (Godschalk and
Krueger 1998, Goldfinger 1999). Of course, issuers could start
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with low or zero fees and raise fees later on when e-money is used
more widely. But such a strategy is not without risks. First of
all, there may be political pressures that make it difficult to
raise fees and, second, there may be competitive pressures. To
give just one example, German banks never managed to introduce a
fee for the use of Eurocheques. Thus, the business case for e-
purses looks doubtful – at least for medium and large value
payments (Godschalk and Krueger 1998, 10). The only area where e-
purses will unambiguously be highly competitive is the area of
unattended POS.31 There seems to be a clear business case for the
replacement of coins. In particular, payment at vending machines,
phones etc. is much more convenient with cards.32
                                                                
31 Another area might be internet payments. However, in this area
e-money does not compete with cash.
32 This result is in line with the findings of Kabelac (1999) who
shows that e-money has a comparative advantage in small
denomination payments.
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IV. The Evidence on Cash Usage from
Macroeconomic Time Series Data33
Several of the technological developments discussed in earlier
Sections of this paper have already been under-way in advanced
countries for many years, so if technology was to be a serious
threat to cash usage, one might expect to find some signs of this
in the data by now. So the first priority of the empirical
exercise in this Section is to examine whether technological
variables could be found that had significant effects on cash
holdings. These are the first set of factors we try to determine.
Perhaps the best published papers on cash usage in recent years
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payment, but the threat of mugging will deter cash holdings among
law-abiding citizens.
So, the second set of factors potentially driving cash usage will
be `bad behaviour', e.g. the grey or black economy domestically,
but also bad economic behaviour by governments with bad inflation
records causing substitution of cash issued by good governments
(e.g. US$ or DM) for domestic currency. Thus a second set of
potential variables were those that might prove a measure of `bad
behaviour', such as Rogoff's tax/GDP and crime proxy variables.
Besides technological and `bad-behaviour' variables, cash
holdings, as a % of GDP, may be influenced by standard macro
variables, interest rates representing the user cost of holding
non-interest-bearing cash, and some measure of real income (to
test whether the income elasticity of cash holding is greater or
less than unity). Such `macro' variables provide a third set of
possible variables.
The ratio of currency holdings to GDP in most (developed)
countries in the last few years has been strongly trended, but the
trends have gone in different directions (Figure 4a, b and c).  If
we were to explain currency holdings adequately, we reckoned that
we needed to be able to give some explanation for the cross-
country differential trends. So our basic econometric model has
been a combination of cross-country and time-series, a panel
approach.
Taking 1997 as an example, the overall average cash to GDP ratio
in our sample is 5.3%. These numbers would appear to imply that
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each person on average would hold about $1635 in the US, and in
Japan 418.200 Yen (  3485 US$) if all such cash was held
domestically. The picture is even more surprising if one looks at
data for large notes outstanding. Figure 2 (presented earlier)
shows that these represent a remarkably large proportion of all
currency outstanding in many countries. According to the currency
statistics each American should carry nine one hundred dollar
bills, and each German at least one 1000 DM bill ( 625 US$) in
1997. These numbers are hardly congruent with common money
holdings for day-to-day purchases. One commonly held view in the
literature is that huge amounts of cash holdings are used in the
black or grey economy for crime, tax evasion, prostitution, drug
dealing, betting, etc. Furthermore, it seems clear that a lot of
US$, Swiss Francs, German Marks and Japanese Yen are held abroad.
Doyle (2000) finds in his recent study that roughly 30% of US
currency and up to 77% of the Swiss currency is held abroad, (also
see the studies of Porter and Judson for the US (1996) and Seitz
for Germany (1995)).  Such huge foreign money holdings can be
attributed to international criminal activity and also to
“dollarisation” in countries with high inflation records and an
unstable political environment. The impact of crime and “bad
behaviour” is likely to be greater for large bank notes, as these
facilitate storing and movement of large sums of money.
Besides the likely different effects of crime and “bad behaviour”
for large (rather than small) notes, we also expect that modern
payment technologies like debit or credit cards would have a more
pronounced effect on small notes. This should be the case as small
notes are used for everyday transactions and might more easily be
substituted by card payments.
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Following Doyle (1999), we split cash outside central banks into
large and small bank notes and run our different regressions for
these series as well. We arbitrarily set the boundary for small
notes at the local currency value of £50.34
To generate a comparable data set we had to restrict ourselves to
annual data from 1980 to 1998 for 18 OECD countries.35  Even so,
for many variables, data were only available for parts of this
period and for a sub-set of countries. In all regressions we used
the biggest data set available.
The main variable of interest was cash holdings. We used as our
main series, and dependent variable, the ratio of cash outside
central banks to GDP (CGDP). To generate the series for small and
large bank notes we arbitrarily set the boundary at the local
currency value of £50. We then deflated both series by GDP, which
gave SmallGDP and LargeGDP.
Our regressors can be roughly divided into three categories:
general macroeconomic variables, technological variables, and “bad
behaviour” variables. We next discuss each set separately.
                                                                
34       At the end 1999 exchange rate.
35       Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United States and United
Kingdom.
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Macroeconomic Variables
1)  Interest rate (i)
This is taken as the nominal overnight money market interest rate.
2)  Real consumption per head (cons)
We converted each series into dollar values at the 1990 exchange
rate. For 5 countries this variable could not be constructed for
the year 1998. Otherwise the data set is complete.
3)  Inflation (infl)
This is derived as the percentage change of the consumer price
index.
4)  The ratio of consumption over GDP (consgdp)
Rationale
The choice of an interest rate and real consumption per head
reflects theories of the demand for money. According to theory,
the interest rate should be negatively correlated with currency
holdings. Real consumption per head is used as the proxy for real
income per household. We used consumption rather than GDP, since
the dependent variable was deflated by GDP, so errors in
estimating GDP would cause spurious correlation. This should be
less so, when consumption deflated by population is used.
Moreover, most cash is used for consumption goods (not for
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investment). The income elasticity of cash holding is normally
found to be less than unity. Given our linear estimation with
variables expressed as ratios, the coefficient for real
consumption per head should therefore show a negative sign.
The rationale for including inflation was to see if higher
inflation decreases the demand for money. This should be the case
as an increase raises the opportunity cost of holding cash and
thus should lead to a decline in money holdings. Given that
expected inflation rates are already incorporated in the interest
rate, no additional negative effects might be seen for this
variable.
The variable Consgdp was used to measure cyclical effects. We
believe that the use of cash should be more stable than GDP.
Shopping for everyday necessities where lots of cash is used is
not as hard hit by a recession as investment or inventories.  The
demand of cash in the underground economy might also be more
stable.36 A recession would thus imply that Consgdp is relatively
high and the ratio of cash to GDP also increases. We therefore
expect a positive sign for Consgdp on CGDP.
Technological Variables
1)  The volume and value of cheque and card payments
                                                                
36       In the black economy the demand for cash might even rise in a
recession.  Might it not be that crime rises during recessions?
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The series of the volume (value) of cheque and card payments were
deflated by GDP per head.  We were able to cover 10 OECD countries
from 1991 till 1998.
2)  The number of ATMs and EFTPOS terminals
The series are both normalised to the number of ATMs and EFTPOS
terminals per million inhabitants. Except for Australia, New
Zealand and Norway, data were available from 1991 till 1998.
3)  Internet hosts (intern)
The series is the number of internet hosts per 10,000 people. All
countries from 1994 till 1997 were included.
4)  The number of telephone mainlines (tel)
The series is normalised to the number of telephone mainlines per
1,000 people. It was available for all countries except Japan from
1980 till 1997.
Rationale
Initially one might expect that the effects of credit cards and
EFTPOS would be to decrease money holdings. Are we not paying our
shopping bills or underground tickets with a credit or debit card
now, when we would have used cash ten or fifteen years ago? This
casual observation appears to be supported by looking at cross-
country differences (Figure 5 and 6).  A negative linear
relationship between cardpayments / EFTPOs and CGDP seems quite
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apparent for 1997. This has been found in the literature. E.g.
Snellman et al (2000) or Boeschoten (1992) found a significant
negative relationship between these technological variables and
the use of cash.
The effects of ATMs might be ambiguous. On the one hand, ATMs
should decrease the transaction costs of money holdings. According
to the Baumol-Tobin theory of the transaction demand for money,
this implies a decrease in money holdings. On the other hand, more
ATMs imply that cash is more readily available, and so an easier
substitute for non-cash payments. Thus it might even increase the
demand for money. The latter argument gets some support by a
cross-country scatter plot for 1997 (Figure 7).  Evidence for both
arguments can also be found in the literature. Snellman et al
(2000) finds a significant negative relationship, whereas earlier
studies (e.g. Boeschoten (1992)) show no significant or a positive
effect.
The latest development in payment technology is the advance of
internet banking. Some, for example Friedman (1999), even forecast
that this, combined with other modern payment technologies, might
threaten the existence of cash in the future altogether. We tried
to see if there were already some significant effects over recent
years. We were, however, unable to find data series for internet
banking. We therefore used the number of internet hosts in each
country form 1994 to 1997 as a proxy.  The cross-country scatter
plot for the year 1994 (Figure 8), suggests that there might
indeed be a negative relationship between CGDP and this variable.
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The last technological variable we considered is the number of
telephone mainlines. This is used as a general proxy for
technological change. We hope that this is also related to
technological progress in the banking sector. We are not too
convinced that it is a very good proxy. It is, however, attractive
as the available data covers the entire time period and is
available for nearly all countries. It should have a negative
effect on cash holdings.
“Bad Behaviour” Variables
1)  Crime
The total number of assaults or major assaults was normalised by
population. A consistent data set could only be constructed for 10
countries from 1980 till 1997.
2)  The ratio of total tax revenue over GDP (RGDP)
Total government revenue was deflated by GDP. We were able to
obtain these data for all countries. Data for the entire time
period were, however, only available for 5 countries.  Whereas
data are available in this case, the question of exactly which
series to use, e.g. what categories of payments to government,
whether to include local as well as central government, is less
clear.  The econometric results can be sensitive to the precise
definitions chosen.
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3) The ratio of the total value of the highest value note
outstanding to the total value of currency outstanding
(hnrel)
This series was constructed by taking the ratio of the total value
of the highest value note outstanding to the total amount of cash
outside central banks.
4) The five year and ten year depreciation of the local currency
with respect to the dollar (5/10)
This is defined as the percentage change of the local currency
relative to the dollar exchange rate at date t and t-5 (t-10). All
countries are covered for the whole time period.  The two series
were multi-collinear, so in practice we only used the five-year
series.
Rationale
Our variable “crime” is used as a proxy for criminal activity.
Rogoff (1998) argues that the effect of an increase in crime on
cash holdings is ambiguous. On the one hand, it should be negative
as the likelihood of getting robbed increases and thus people
carry less cash. On the other hand, it should increase the demand
for cash in the criminal fraternity.
Cagan (1958) was the first to argue that the high amount of cash
outstanding could be due to the demand for cash in the underground
economy. The ratio of taxes to GDP should increase money holdings
as citizens try to evade taxes by shifting part of their economic
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activity to the black or grey economy, in which paying with cash
is the common practice. Other studies confirmed this result, see
Tanzi (1982), Porter and Judson (1996), Rogoff (1998) or Sprenkle
(1993).  Using cointegration methods, Doyle (1999), however,
challenged these findings, as his results for 15 industrialised
countries indicate that the amount of taxes either have no
significant, or a negative effect, on currency holdings.
As mentioned earlier, criminals tend to pay and store large sums
of money in cash.  It is much easier with high value notes. Given
other criteria, international criminals should prefer currencies
with a higher value of the highest note outstanding.  A higher
ratio of the total value of the highest value note outstanding to
the total value of currency outstanding should thus increase the
total demand for money.
A vast amount of Dollars and Deutsche Marks outstanding are
currently held outside the country of origin. Besides historical
reasons and ease of acceptance, the demand for foreign money
holdings might be attributed to a low inflation record. This
effect should reinforce the domestic negative effect of inflation.
Furthermore, the stability of a currency towards the “world”
currency, the US dollar, should be an important determinant in
foreign money holdings. We try to take these effects into account
with the five and ten year depreciation of the currency with the
respect to the dollar. Depreciation should generally weaken the
demand for the currency. Given our definition of the exchange rate
as the amount of home currency per US$, the sign should be
negative.
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Estimation Procedures
There is no theoretical model which specifies exactly which
variables should be included and which not. We, therefore, worked
our way from a general to a specific parameterisation of the
demand for cash.  We used two criteria for the elimination of
variables to arrive at our preferred specification: the first was
whether that variable had a low t-statistic; the second was
whether it most limited the size of our sample to fewer countries
and years.  Due to theoretical reasons the interest rate and real
consumption were never eliminated.
This procedure left us with Specification I, with nine independent
variables, each of which was significant and correctly signed in
at least one of the equations.
Specification I:
[Insert Specification I]
As we had to estimate in first differences, in order to eliminate
trended variables, and to achieve stationarity, and had data for
ATMs and EFTPOs from 1991 till 1998 for 16 countries, we had only
about 70 data points from 1992 till 1998.  For the effects of
payment technologies, these results are the best we can present.
The results can be seen in Table 1.
The omission of ATMs and EFTPOs enlarged the sample to over 130
data points from 1981 till 1998.  This gave us Specification II.
Specification II
[Insert Specification II]
Our results are shown in Table 2.
[Insert Table 1 and Table 2]
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Our discussion of these regressions follows the broad separation
of explanatory variables into those that are (i) macroeconomic,
(ii) technological and (iii) “bad behaviour” variables.
Macroeconomic Variables:
Both in Specification I and Specification II (Tables 1 and 2) the
interest rate (i) always enters negatively (as would be expected
from standard theory) for CGDP and LargeGDP. For SmallGDP, not
only the significance but also the sign changes with fewer years.
This weak result for small notes is not surprising. We assume that
they are used for everyday transactions. Small changes in the
interest rate should not alter standard everyday transaction
habits drastically.
Real income (Cons) enters negatively as predicted, though not
significantly so for large bank notes.  This, again, is not
unexpected as we assumed that large bank notes are used primarily
for ”bad behaviour”.
Our cyclical variable (Consgdp) enters with a positive sign and is
significant for SmallGDP and CGDP. For LargeGDP, no significant
effect can be shown, (perhaps because `bad behaviour’ is more pro-
cyclical than consumption?).  The effects of the cyclical variable
are highly robust to changes in the data set.
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Inflation dropped out earlier in the process of testing down to
the preferred specification.37
Resume:
In our estimations we find the standard effects for macroeconomic
variables on the demand for cash. We additionally showed that
cyclical effects are an important determinant for money holdings
relative to GDP.
Technological Variables:
ATMs and EFTPOS terminals are the only technological variables we
found significant in any specification. Given our results (Table
1) it seems that both have pronounced effects only on the demand
for small bank notes.
The impact of EFTPOS is significantly negative only for SmallGDP.
This, at first disappointing, result is, however, not at odds with
our earlier discussion, where we argued that progress in payment
technology should have a more distinct effect on small bank notes.
As these are mostly used for everyday transactions, they are more
easily replaced by electronic payment methods. We also assumed
                                                                
37  This may seem surprising since, on its own, inflation is
significantly negatively related to currency holding.  But,
according to theory, (the Fisher relationship), nominal interest
rates depend on real rates, plus expected inflation.  So, once
nominal interest rates enter into demand for money studies, (e.g.
Goldfeld 1973), inflation often drops out.  It is only in cases
where nominal interest rates fail to reflect inflationary
expectations well, (as often occurs in hyperinflationary
conditions), that inflation becomes strongly significant in
multiple regression exercises.
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that large bank notes are held mainly in the black and grey
economy and predicted, therefore, no great impact of modern
payment technologies on the demand for them. This, indeed, seems
to be the case and the insignificant effect for large bank notes
drives the effect on the overall demand for cash.  In contrast,
the demand for small bank notes appears to be significantly and
positively related to the number of ATMs.38  People may go more
often to the cash machine to get small amounts of money, implying
an increase in the demand for small bank notes.
Resume:
The evidence for technological variables altogether implies that
they did not have an important effect on the demand for cash in
the last 10 years. The only significant influence could be shown
for ATMs (positive) and EFTPOS (negative) on the demand for small
bank notes under certain specifications, (and these latter results
were not all that robust to varying the number of countries, or
years, included in the regressions).
“Bad Behaviour” Variables
All the proposed “bad behaviour” variables, except “crime”,
appeared to have an impact on money holdings.
                                                                
38       Its impact on LargeGDP and CGDP is not significant, but
shows a negative sign.
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In accordance with results in the literature, we found a positive
effect of taxation on the demand for money. The effect on holdings
of small notes is less than for large ones, which is not
surprising.
One has, however, to be very cautious with this result. The
significance level of RGDP is highly dependent not only on the
time period covered, but also on the countries included. One can
see the effects of the inclusion of different years by changes in
the estimates from Specification I to Specification II (Tables 1
and 2). More worrying is how volatile the result is to the exact
countries included. For example, we re-estimated Specification II
without Austria. This small change had a drastic consequence for
the significance level of RGDP. Its t-statistic dropped from 1.81
to just over 0.33. The positive sign, however, remained.
The effects for hnrel are amongst the most robust in our exercise.
The higher the ratio of the total value of all the highest value
notes outstanding to the total value of notes outstanding the more
cash there is relative to GDP. This is exactly what we expected.
This effect is reversed for small bank notes. It seems that the
use of the highest value note has a negative effect on the use of
small bank notes.  We may, perhaps, be picking up the two
different effects of crime, since we expected hnrel to be a proxy
for cash use in “bad behaviour”. There we noted two effects: it
lowers money holdings, as the likelihood of getting robbed
increases (the effect on small bank notes). On the other, hand it
increases the demand for cash as one needs large sums of cash to
ship and store value.  Unfortunately, our data set for the
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variable “crime” was too limited to investigate these effects more
thoroughly with another more direct proxy for criminal activity.
Future research might help to clarify this issue.
The five year depreciation with respect to the $US shows the
assumed negative influence on the demand for cash in Specification
II with the most data. The sign and the significance level are,
however, highly year and country dependent.
Resume:
“Bad behaviour” seems to have an important impact on the demand
for cash balances. National and international dimensions of “bad
behaviour”, such as RGDP, hnrel and the 5 year depreciation,
appear to be the main driving forces for cash holdings. The signs
of these variables are quite robust. For RGDP and the five year
depreciation, the t-statistic is, however, very volatile,
depending on the set of countries and the time period covered.
Conclusions
If the last twenty years are a guide to the future, then we are
quite confident that cash is not an endangered species. On our
evidence, the effects of modern payment technologies on the demand
for cash are not that strong.39 We could only find a significant
                                                                
39  These results are in line with those Snellman et al (2000).
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negative effect for EFTPOs on the demand for small money balances.
This, however, is quite powerful. If we assume an average annual
growth of EFTPOs of 20% and that we could extrapolate the
estimated linear relationship, then it would only take 15 years
until no small bank notes would be held in the US anymore.
However, the advance of ATMs has seemed to increase the demand for
small notes. Given these opposite forces, it seems that technology
is not crowding out small bank notes entirely. In any case
technology so far has had no appreciable effects on the demand for
large bank noets, and hence on the overall demand for currency,
whose overall amount outstanding is more influenced by large, than
by small, note holdings.  Furthermore, “bad behaviour” variables
show strong positive effects on the demand for small and large
bank notes.
V. Conclusions
New means of electronic payment are, no doubt, fascinating from a
technological point of view. This by itself already makes them
look superior. In addition, they have some undeniable advantages
when compared with cash. However, technological sophistication can
also imply more complexity, including the need for more
information transfers and more steps in the process. There is
nothing as simple and straight-forward as making a cash payment.
The payer hands over a physical object, eg. a bank note, to the
payee. Even a small child is capable of comprehending such a
transaction. In principle, the two parties involved do not need
any special software or hardware for this transaction. There is
also no need to inform a third party to make the transfer valid.
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The payee can immediately re-spend the money he or she received.
By contrast, e-payments usually involve a third party as
intermediary. Even in offline transactions funds received have to
be authenticated by the issuer and cannot be immediately re-spent
(the only exception being Mondex). The transaction itself consists
of communication between electronic devices. For payer and payee
there is no direct way of control what type of information is
exchanged and what is stored. These features of electronic
payments have important implications.
Users concerned about anonymity will generally prefer to use cash
rather than e-money. There are many reasons why people may prefer
anonymity – many of which are connected with “bad” behaviour.
Black or grey economies as well over-intrusive governments are
examples of such behaviour. [The following three sentences are
from the conclusions of chapter 4 and would have to be deleted
from that chapter.] Even though politicians always announce that
they want to be tougher on crime, we are sure that they will not
succeed entirely. Black and grey economies will persist in the
future. Similarly, governments will continue to “mis-behave”. This
implies a powerful source of demand for cash balances.
Surprisingly, sophistication also seems to increase vulnerability.
The simplicity of cash means that every cash user can to some
extent help to detect fraud. In an e-money system this task is
entirely confined to the system operators (and specialised police
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forces). This implies that costs to protect the system will remain
high.
Renowned economists such as B. Friedman or M. King worry whether
currency and Central Banks can survive the IT revolution. Many
other financial intermediaries may disappear, or change their role
dramatically, but currency and Central Banks are among the safer
financial institutions to survive the new Millennium. Stop
worrying!
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Figure 3
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Figure 4
Currency outside central banks over GDP
(a)
Source: The sources for this, and all subsequent figures, are to be
found in Drehmann and Goodhart (2000)
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Figure 5
Figure 6
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Figure 7
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